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Risky Calculations: Financial Mathematics and 
Securitization since the 1970s  
Martin Lengwiler ∗ 
Abstract: »Risikokalkulationen: Finanzmathematik und Verbriefung seit den 
1970ern«. The article investigates the history of securitization in order to ana-
lyze more general transformations in the social and political approaches to-
wards various types of credit risks. The history of securitization reveals a long-
term shift in the conventions addressed when dealing with risks. Socio-political 
conventions were gradually replaced by financialized, market-oriented conven-
tions in which investors would take responsibilities and replace other actors, 
like the state or private corporations, which were previously involved. The first 
part of the article examines the epistemic and economic origins of securitiza-
tion. In the second part, the analysis focuses on the golden age of securitiza-
tion, from the 1980s to the mid-2000s, discussing decisive factors for its ex-
pansion. The third part reflects the role of securitization in the financial crisis 
of 2007/08 and debates the extent to which mathematical expertise can be 
made responsible for the collapsing securities market. 
Keywords: Securitization, financialization, quantification, financial markets, 
financial mathematics, insurance, risk, conventions. 
1.  Introduction1 
The increased social relevance of economic values and market-based interac-
tions over the past decades – not least since the financial crises of 2001 and 
2007/08 – has provoked a growing interest, within social sciences and histori-
ography, in economic issues beyond the traditional fields of economics and 
economic history. In recent years, several authors, by combining approaches 
from sociology, anthropology, institutional theory, and the history and sociolo-
gy of science and technology, pointed to the social conditions, conventions, and 
implications of economic practices and market-related interactions. One field 
of research is represented by studies on the relation between economics and the 
economy – more precisely on the epistemic and technical conditions of finan-
cial markets, such as the role of theoretical models and technical systems for 
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the performance of markets, or the relation between modern finance theory and 
transformations of investment practices in financial markets. Alain 
Desrosière’s work on the co-constitution of statistics, economics, and the mod-
ern state has provided an ongoing stimulus for these critical studies of financial 
markets (seminal: Desrosières 2008a, 2008b; Callon 1998; see also: Orléan 
2014; Beckert, Diaz-Bone and Ganßmann 2007; for an exemplary case study: 
MacKenzie 2006). A second area of research focuses on the transfer and adop-
tion of economic logics and practices to social contexts outside their traditional 
field (for a historical perspective: Mass 2016). 
2.  Securitization from the Perspective of the Sociology of 
Conventions 
This article investigates a specific type of financial transactions: the process of 
securitization of credit risks that is the transformation of financial risks into 
investment products in order to sell them on the financial market. This financial 
instrument has massively expanded since the 1970s and has infiltrated crucial 
parts of the financial sector. Securitization gained much prominence in the 
1990s and 2000s, and was made responsible – at least partially – for the out-
break of the financial crisis in 2007/08. It has continued to spread after the 
recent recovery of the markets. Securitization has the potential – as will be 
argued below – for transforming social and political attitudes to risk, and intro-
ducing and diffusing changing forms of ownership and responsibilities towards 
risks. The trend towards securitization is not only relevant for a changed under-
standing of risk. By using highly mathematized investment products, it also 
offers an exemplary case to analyze the relevance of processes of quantification 
for the diffusion of financial values and techniques.  
On a theoretical level, the article is based on the sociology of conventions. 
For several reasons, this approach offers a promising analytical tool for study-
ing financial markets. It combines the study of institutions – here: financial 
markets – with a pragmatic, actor-centered focus on the conventions used by 
actors – the modes of justification or reasoning (Diaz-Bone 2011, 23 et seq.). 
Moreover, the sociology of conventions is based upon the idea that economics 
and markets are socially embedded. In light of constructivist approaches, not 
least of Desrosière’s analysis of the “politics of large numbers” and the role of 
conventions of equivalence – technical norms, measurements and standards – 
in the formation of modern nation-states, the sociology of convention shifted 
the focus from the state to the economy and the market, where similar epistem-
ic processes are at work (Diaz-Bone 2015, 291-320). The types of conventional 
frameworks are defined in an open, flexible, and empirically grounded way, 
distinguishing a plurality of modes, such as industrial, market-related, family-
based, civic, or welfare-related conventions (Diaz-Bone 2011, 23 et seq.; Diaz-
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Bone and Salais 2011). This flexible understanding of conventions makes the 
concept highly appropriate to understanding the transformations of values 
involved in securitization.  
In line with this theoretical tradition, Eve Chiapello recently introduced the 
concept of financialization in order to understand the changing forms of valua-
tion in the financial sector and in other parts of society.2 Financialization 
means, according to Chiapello, a process with which financialized valuations 
and conventions expand and colonize other political, social, or cultural practic-
es. Financialized conventions are marked by approaches from the disciplines of 
financial economics and mathematical finance – academic fields dedicated to 
studying, with highly formalized and quantified models, the mechanisms of 
financial markets, in particular the calculation of prices and values. In this 
sense, financialization is understood as a particular – and particularly influen-
tial – form of economization, marked by a high degree of mathematization and 
quantification. That process is also seen as a key aspect of recent transfor-
mations of capitalism (Chiapello 2015, 13-7). Also drawing on the sociology of 
conventions, André Orléan argued that the formal and mathematical conven-
tions of economics were exemplary practices for the emerging financialized 
capitalism. They acted as normative claims and thus created the specific forms 
of financialization. The recent crisis of financial markets is for Orléan also a 
crisis of the epistemic basis of economics. By criticizing rational choice para-
digms, he calls for a more sociological understanding of the concept of value 
(Orléan 2014, 259-71, 311-21). 
Securitization is clearly one of the more prominent and exemplary business 
fields related to the process of financialization as understood by Chiapello or 
Orléan. Here too, quantification is a key issue. The construction and calculation 
of securities in this context is linked to highly sophisticated mathematical and 
actuarial models. The process of securitization thus operates by quantifying 
assessments about credit risks, defining a price based on these calculations, and 
selling the risks – in a repackaged form – as securities to investors. Against this 
background, the article also asks about the conditions and effects of processes 
of quantification in the context of securitization, drawing on the pertinent lit-
erature on the social and cultural implications of calculation and quantification 
(Porter 1995; Callon 1998, 6-12; Lampland and Star 2008; Desrosières 2008a, 
2008b). What role does scientific expertise – in particular mathematics and 
actuarial theory (the insurance-related sub-discipline of mathematics) – play in 
the process of securitization? To what degree did these “conventions of equiva-
lence” (Desrosières) accelerate the trend towards securitization? How im-
portant were mathematical models for legitimating innovative investment 
products, given that quantification is generally understood as a “technology of 
                                                             
2  See also the contribution of Chiapello and Walter in this HSR Special Issue. 
HSR 41 (2016) 2  │  261 
trust” (Porter 1995)? And to what degree were mathematicians and actuaries 
responsible for the failure of securitization in the context of the crisis of 
2007/08?  
What exactly is meant by securitization? The concept, used since the late 
1970s, refers to a relatively new instrument for transforming financial risks – 
usually credit risks – into securities, that is, into investment products to be sold 
to investors, either directly or via financial markets (Gorvett 1999, 138-40; 
Kothari 2014). Securitization, as a technique to turn rights to future cash flows 
into tradable securities, emerged in the 1970s and played a controversial role in 
the financial crisis of 2007/08. The products of securitization belong to the 
category of structured investment products, themselves being a subcategory of 
the large variety of derivatives. Securitization thus became infamous for some 
of the notoriously opaque forms of investment vehicles, in particular for the 
families of asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS). In retrospect, securitization is thus seen as a crucial factor for the quick 
spread of financial risks after the collapse of the U.S. market for subprime 
mortgages in 2007, leading directly to the liquidity crisis of the U.S. and inter-
national banking system in the following year (Lybeck 2011, 141-70; Cox, 
Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 158). 
But securitization is more than just an element of the financial crisis of 
2007/08. The technique established itself in the banking and insurance industry 
long beforehand and independent from the immediate pre-history of the crisis. 
Moreover, many actors in the financial industry grant securitization the poten-
tial of transforming the industry as a whole. It is still debated – and will be 
analyzed in this article – whether securitization marks a structural shift in bank-
ing and insurance, transforming the way financial institutions and societies deal 
with credit and other social and natural risks. Thus, the article also addresses 
the question of how much securitization transformed the social responsibilities 
towards risks and the related mechanisms of solidarity. To what degree are 
risks, previously seen as a social or political issue, currently being treated as 
part of the mechanisms of financial markets? 
The rise and spread of securitization was fueled by two factors. The basic 
conditions were laid down in the 1950s by epistemic innovations in economics 
and actuarial science, in particular the development of mathematical models for 
option pricing and other price mechanisms on the financial markets. The other 
factor is constituted by the drastically increased demand for innovative finan-
cial products which emerged in the 1980s, and has ever since driven the trend 
towards securitization.  
Both factors are related: Mathematical expertise was an important condition 
for the legitimacy and the reputation of securitization, as illustrated by the 
positive ratings for asset-backed securities by the major credit rating agencies. 
And the expanding demand for products of securitization led to a quickly grow-
ing market, which reinforced epistemic processes by attracting parts of the 
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mathematical community and strengthening the new field of mathematical 
finance. These interactions shall be analyzed, together with their range and 
social implications, in this article. The argument is structured in three parts. 
The first part examines the origins of securitization – both on the epistemic and 
the economic level. The second part analyzes the golden age of securitization, 
from the 1980s to the mid-2000s, pointing at the decisive factors for its expan-
sion. The third part investigates the role of securitization in the financial crisis 
of 2007/08 – in particular the debate to what extent mathematical expertise was 
responsible for the collapsing market for securities. It also looks at the recovery 
of securitization since the peak of the crisis, discussing the reasons for its resil-
ience. The conclusion summarizes the fundamental changes, provoked by the 
rise of securitization, in the social responsibilities towards the concerned risks.  
The article is marked by a special interest in the specific, historically im-
portant area of securitization in insurance. Insurance is indeed an exemplary 
field for the history of securitization. As a technique against the risk of finan-
cial losses, securitization gained particular prominence in insurance from early 
on, especially in reinsurance. Today, securitization is seen as a prominent form 
of an alternative risk transfer. Risk transfers lie at the heart of the reinsurance 
business. In their common form, they consist of distributing the risks between 
the insurer and the reinsurer, as specified in the reinsurance contract. If an 
insurer chooses some alternative risk transfer, it usually means that the insurer 
tries to bypass the common deals with reinsurance companies. Insurance relat-
ed securitization implies that the insurer, instead of going to a reinsurance 
company, turns its risk into an investment vehicle. Although securitization is 
usually more expensive than reinsurance, primary insurers still use it as a more 
efficient allocation of risks, especially in cases with the risk of huge losses 
(where reinsurance is often unavailable) or in areas where long-term guarantees 
are needed (given that reinsurance contracts are usually short-termed, often just 
for a one-year delay; Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 158, 184). In certain 
fields of the insurance market, like the insurance of natural catastrophes, secu-
ritization established itself as respected alternative to reinsurance, with a cur-
rent market share of about 10 per cent (Swiss Re 2013; Philips 2014).  
3.  The Origins of Securitization: Emergence of 
Mathematical Finance and Booming Demand for 
Investment Products 
The mathematical foundations for securitization stretch back into the 1950s and 
are closely linked to the growing influence of mathematical approaches in 
economics, in particular to the emergence of the field of mathematical finance 
(Bühlmann and Lengwiler 2015). Before that, mathematicians and actuaries 
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considered financial markets too complex for mathematical analysis. The lack 
of tools, like the computer, for calculating highly complex data strengthened 
this conviction. The analysis of financial markets by econometricians was 
limited to analyzing the economic role of interest, in particular to calculating 
interest rate term structures (the calculation on the dependency of market inter-
est rates on the time to maturity; Nitzsche 2012; Aase 2012).  
In the 1950s, economists increasingly began to adopt mathematical ap-
proaches for their models. Figures such as Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu 
revived the concept of a general economic equilibrium, classically defined by 
Léon Walras in the 1870s. Arrow had already tried to use the idea of complete 
markets (a market with full transparency and no transaction costs) in order to 
mathematically calculate the price of securities (Arrow 1951; Debreu 1959). 
These models were already based on the theoretical assumption of no-arbitrage, 
according to which markets are complete, transaction costs nonexistent, and 
prices set in complete transparency. The breakthrough for the calculation of 
market-based price mechanisms came in the early 1970s with the design of a 
model for option pricing, based on the principle of no-arbitrage, by Fischer 
Black, Myron Scholes and – independently – by Robert C. Merton (Black and 
Scholes 1973; Merton 1973). The Black-Scholes model allowed for the calcu-
lation of specific forms of option trading at stock exchanges and opened the 
door to a wide range of applications. It became an important factor for the 
boom of derivative markets in the 1980s, especially at the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange (CBOE), an exchange installed by the Chicago Board of Trade 
in 1973. The seminal works of Black, Scholes, and Merton also marked a crys-
tallizing moment for the development of mathematical finance, a new and 
immensely successful combination of economics, applied mathematics and – 
partly – actuarial science (for a detailed account of the emergence of financial 
economics: MacKenzie 2006, 119-78; see also MacKenzie 2007).  
In actuarial science, the emergence of mathematical finance prepared the 
ground for the foundation of a sub-section of the International Actuarial Asso-
ciation (IAA) in 1988 – only the second sub-section in the IAA’s history – 
dedicated to the “Actuarial Approach for Financial Risks” (AFIR). The founda-
tion of AFIR was marked by a controversial debate within the IAA on the 
relevance of financial markets as a topic for actuarial research (Bühlmann and 
Lengwiler 2015; Bühlmann 1987). But since the 1990s, the field of mathemati-
cal finance has firmly established itself at the crossroads of economics and 
actuarial science. Today, it is widely accepted that mathematical finance has 
the potential of transforming traditional approaches of actuarial theory, for 
example in the understanding of risks of financial markets and the calculation 
of reserves invested at the financial markets (Bühlmann 1998; Bühlmann and 
Lengwiler 2015).  
Apart from this epistemic factor, the emergence of securitization also profit-
ed from the stock market boom, especially from the expansion of the market 
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for derivatives, fueled by the increased demand of investors since the 1980s 
(Cassis 2010, 248-55). In its current form, securitization was first used on the 
U.S. mortgage market in a social-political logic. In the mid-1970s, after the 
recession of 1973/74, the U.S. government tried to counter the mortgage and 
credit restrictions of the U.S. banking system by creating a secondary market 
for mortgages based on government guarantees for mortgage loans and provid-
ed by government agencies like Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac 
(Cassis 2010, 252 et seq.; Hill 1996). The socio-political side of it was that 
securitization was meant to make mortgages more affordable for the lower-
middle classes, especially in the context of the credit crunch, widespread in the 
late 1970s as banks restricted the availability of credits. Securitization proved 
to be an important element in improving the financial stability of the govern-
ment-sponsored mortgage agencies. Already in 1968, the Johnson administra-
tion created the “Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation” (“Freddie Mac”), 
a private organization for sponsoring home ownership, which joined its sister 
agencies “Ginnie Mae” (“Government National Mortgage Association”), and 
“Fannie Mae” (“Federal National Mortgage Administration”), two organiza-
tions with origins stretching back to New Deal legislation of 1938. Ginnie Mae 
and Fannie Mae were originally designated for government employees and 
veterans. Since 1970, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were allowed not only to 
buy mortgages on the secondary market, but also to pool them and sell them as 
mortgage-backed securities; Fannie Mae sold the securities to the government 
owned Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac sold them to the financial market. As all three 
organizations profited from a de facto government guarantee, investors were 
keen to buy the papers (Lybeck 2011, 120-9, 141; Geisst 2013, 225-9; Hill 
1996, 1064-76, 1119-21). 
Also in the 1970s, the banking sector began to adopt the new instrument. 
Banks first used securitization for their mortgage business, following the ex-
ample of the government sponsored mortgage agencies. The practice spread 
especially in niches of the mortgage market, for example for lower quality 
mortgages or large mortgages. Bank of America introduced securitization in 
1977, in particular to raise its capital basis and to be able to meet the growing 
demand for mortgages. Securitization expanded in the 1980s, when it was 
taken up by a variety of financial institutes, for securities based on credit card 
debts, auto loans, and other assets (Hill 1996, 1120 et seq.; Gorvett 1999, 138-
40; Cowley and Cummins 2005, 194 et seq.). Between the 1980s and the 2007 
crisis, securitization became a widespread phenomenon in investment banking. 
In the U.S. market just before 2007, mortgage- or asset-backed securities repre-
sented nearly one third of all banking assets, amounting to nearly 3,000 billion 
dollars (De Mey 2007, 37). By 2007, the subprime mortgage sector, in which 
securitization was widespread, represented 12 per cent of the U.S. mortgage 
market (Lybeck 2011, 127-9). All sectors contributed to this growth: mortgage-
backed securities, insurance-backed securities, as well as those backed by car 
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loans, credit card debts, or student loans (Cummins 2004, 7 et seq., 48). The 
popularity of securitization is illustrated by the fact that the technique even 
spread to the entertainment industry in the form of “celebrity bonds.” As one of 
the first artists, David Bowie used securitization in 1997 to raise 55 million 
dollars, backed by the royalties of his past albums (Fabozzi and Kothari 2008, 
3).  
The expansion of securitization was combined with a redefinition of its log-
ic. Whereas in the 1970s, securitization was embedded in a social policy 
framework (to make mortgages more accessible), in the 1980s and 1990s it 
gradually became a financial instrument to improve corporate profits and ap-
pease the appetite of investors for profitable investment products. The rise of 
securitization to an exemplary practice of a financialized capitalism and its 
redefinition from a socio-political to a financialized convention can be ex-
plained by three factors.  
First, securitization profited from a general deregulation of the financial sec-
tor since the 1980s – in the U.S. as well as in the European Union. The market 
was opened for new competitors, whereas traditional corporations – banks and 
insurances – also expanded their business activities. As an effect of this, banks 
increasingly had to compete with money market funds, mutual funds, life in-
surance companies, and other financial service providers. This was paralleled 
by a wave of corporate mergers and the launch of new financial products. In 
this context, securitization was used as an instrument to improve the competi-
tiveness of financial institutions, not least by reducing credit risks and thus 
increasing the capital basis, liquidity, and credit ratings of the respective com-
panies (Orléan 2014, 264-71; Cummins 2004, 2, 15-21; Hill 1997, 1122-5). 
A second factor was supportive government legislation, especially in the 
U.S. In the 1980s, U.S. tax regulation was reformed to offer tax advantages for 
the new investment products (Hill 1996, 1120 et seq.). A third – and probably 
the most important – factor for the spread of securitization was the rapidly 
growing demand of investors for new financial products. This was partly an 
effect of a structural change in the banking business: the rise of investment 
banking and the relative decline of commercial banking. That trend gained 
momentum since the 1970s and led to a proliferation of financial products, 
among them also derivatives like the products of securitization. During the 
stock market boom of the 1980s, investors not only asked for traditional prod-
ucts but also took up the quickly developing range of derivatives, in particular 
those that did not follow the cyclical performance of traditional stocks and 
bonds. Securitized products often had an acyclical or an anticyclical perfor-
mance, which allowed investors to diversify their portfolio and hedge against 
high levels of risks in their portfolio or generally against the risk of a cyclical 
development of stock markets. In this sense, securitization has been called a 
“low-cost sweetener for lemons” (“lemons” being poor investments; Hill 1999; 
see also: Cassis 2010, 243-53; Cummins 2004, 13).  
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Whereas in banking, securitization mirrors the attempt of financial institu-
tions to improve their profitability as well as the increased demand for innova-
tive investment products, the interest of insurance corporations had a different 
background. The market for insurance-linked securities also expanded on a 
lower level than the one in banking. Just before the 2007 crisis, the total 
amount of securitized risks in insurance was 10 billion dollars (compared to 
3,000 billion dollars in mortgage- and asset-backed securities; De Mey 2007, 
37, see also: Cummins 2004, 7 et seq., 48). Between the 1980s and 2007, 35 
billion dollars of insurance liabilities have been securitized. The total of secu-
ritized assets is worth less than a thousandth of all reinsurance liabilities (fig-
ures of 2007, Baig and Choudhry 2013, 24-7). In insurance, securitization 
remained a technique for niche markets. It is mainly used for large risks, such 
as catastrophe risks, where it gained a prominent role. In reinsurance, for ex-
ample, the extent of securitization amounted to 11 per cent of its non-life pre-
mium income in 2004 (De Mey 2007, 37).  
Nevertheless, the case of insurance-related securitization is relevant because 
it can help to illuminate not yet mentioned factors and implications of the histo-
ry of securitization. It shows that a traditionally risk-averse industry – at least 
in its use of capital reserves during the decades after the Second World War – 
started to open itself to more speculative policies since the 1980s. This was a 
direct consequence of the stock market boom of the 1980s. At that time, insur-
ance companies realized that investing their reserves in stocks and bonds in-
creased their profits, and that their earnings were increasingly linked to the 
development of capital markets. Some corporations earned their profits more so 
from investments in capital markets than from their traditional insurance busi-
ness (Bühlmann and Lengwiler 2015).  
This trend was followed, in the 1990s, by a structural transformation of the 
insurance business as a whole: its increasing integration with the banking busi-
ness under the term of “bancassurance.” The trend is mirrored by a series of 
mergers between banks and insurance companies. Examples are the merger 
between Citicorp (a bank) and Travelers (an insurer) to Citigroup (1998), or the 
take-over of Winterthur (an insurer) by Credit Suisse in 1997. Bancassurance 
fueled the development of combining banking and insurance products, deliv-
ered by one and the same company, and increased the technical cooperation 
between insurance actuaries and business economists for developing invest-
ment products and modelling insurance and investment risks (Bühlmann and 
Lengwiler 2015; Cummins 2004, 15-21). As a business model, bancassurance 
did not prevail and was abandoned after the crisis of 2001. Still, many forms of 
cooperation between insurance and banking remained, not least in the devel-
opment of investment products.  
This was the fertile ground on which insurance-related securitization 
emerged in the late 1980s. The first insurers to deviate from the established 
way were companies trying to avoid the common procedures and costs of rein-
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surance. Though reinsurance can offer less expensive contracts than the compa-
rable costs for securitization, it has also, as mentioned above, important disad-
vantages when compared to coverage over financial markets. Reinsurance 
contracts are usually short-termed, often with a contract period of just one year. 
Moreover, some unconventional or excessive risks were usually not covered by 
reinsurance. In these cases, securitization offered an alternative with fewer 
transaction costs, mainly because capital markets were able to mobilize far 
more capital and in a more flexible way than insurance or reinsurance compa-
nies (Cummins 2009, 466, 475; Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen 2000). The capital 
basis of the reinsurance sector (estimated at around 300 billion dollars) is still a 
dwarf – around 300 times smaller – against the dimensions of the financial 
markets (estimated at over 100 trillion dollars; Hewitt EnnisKnupp 2014, 2).  
Thus, insurance-based securitization became an instrument to mobilize capi-
tal for over-sized, catastrophic risks like windstorms or earthquakes. American 
life insurance corporations started the securitization of their insured liabilities 
in 1988. An important step was made when, in 1992, the Chicago Board of 
Trade, the leading stock exchange for futures, options, and derivatives, accept-
ed the first “catastrophe bond,” a security based on catastrophic property risks 
(Cummins 2004, 2). Around half of these bonds were addressed specifically to 
extraordinary, “once in a century” events. The category of Cat bonds became 
the motor for the development of securitization in insurance. The 1990s and the 
early 2000s witnessed a boom of securitization in insurance, spurred by a series 
of catastrophic events with excessive losses for the insurance and reinsurance 
industry, such as hurricane Andrew (1992), the Northridge earthquake (1994), 
the attack on the World Trade Center (2001), and hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 
Wilma (all in 2005; De Mey 2007, 37-42; Cummins 2004, 2009, 463 et seq.). 
Another driving force was – similar to securitization in banking – the rising 
regulatory demands, in particular for capital reserves, in the aftermath of Basel 
I (1988), during negotiations of Basel II (which started in 1999 and were con-
cluded in 2004), and in the context of the European Union solvency prescrip-
tions for the insurance industry (Solvency I, 2002; Lybeck 2011, 230-5; Cum-
mins 2004, 13; 2009, 482-8).  
Last but not least, securitization also expanded as part of corporate policies 
for tax evasion. Many corporations, among them Swiss Re, founded so-called 
“captives” – sub-companies for covering particularly high risks, mainly domi-
ciled in tax-saving offshore places like Bermuda – for their securitization busi-
ness (Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 166-168).  
The insurance corporations active in securitization included some of the 
leading companies. One of the first movers was AIG (“American International 
Group”), an American insurance company, which earned a reputation for ag-
gressively entering the new securities market. AIG launched in 1992 the first 
cat bond due to cover against wind and earthquake risks. In 2008, it had to be 
saved by a government loan, becoming the largest victim in the insurance sec-
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tor of the crisis (Shelp and Ehrbar 2009; Greenberg and Cunningham 2013). 
The US company USAA and the French AXA also belonged to the pioneers in 
securitization (AXA for its car insurance branch, USAA rather for Cat bonds), 
as well as Zurich Financial Services and Winterthur (De Mey 2007, 38; Wem-
mer 2008, 1 et seq.; Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 159, 165-7).  
Reinsurance companies found themselves in a difficult situation. The rein-
surance industry was split over how to deal with securitization. Some compa-
nies avoided the securities market as they saw it as an alternative and a compe-
tition to their core business. Others entered the new market in an attempt not to 
miss out on a structural transformation of their business. Some of the leading 
reinsurers, most notably Swiss Re and St. Paul Re, decided for the second 
option – at the beginning reluctantly – and became important promoters of 
securitization by the end of the 1990s (De Mey 2007, 38; Wemmer 2008, 1 et 
seq.; Cummins 2009, 464; Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 159; Bühlmann 
and Lengwiler 2015).  
Although the life insurance market played a minor role in insurance-related 
securitization, it was not untouched by the trend (Cowley and Cummins 2005). 
Such securities were primarily based on mortality and longevity risks. Techni-
cally, these bonds were based on mortality or longevity indexes, constructed by 
experts. The profit for the investor depended on whether or not the observed 
mortality or longevity rate exceeded the assumption calculated by the index 
(Cipra 2010, 549-52; De Mey 2007, 38). Longevity bonds in particular are seen 
as an innovative and promising field for securitization, though they are also 
known to be notoriously difficult to calculate. The number of unsuccessful 
securities is comparably high (De Mey 2007, 39 et seq.). The first companies to 
enter this field were American Skandia and Hannover Re – already in the late 
1990s – followed by a series of life insurers and reinsurers, such as AIG, Pru-
dential, MONY, Barclays Life, AXA, Swiss Re, Scottish Re, and Munich Re. 
Banking houses like the European Investment Bank and BNP Paribas also 
contributed to this quickly growing market (Cipra 2010, 549-53; De Mey 2007, 
38 et seq.; Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 163; for detailed lists of compa-
nies and bonds: Cowley and Cummins 2005, 209; Larson 2012, 8 et seq.).  
The growing interest in life insurance securitization is also due to the ex-
traordinary social and political significance of this sector. Mortality and lon-
gevity rates are affecting not only life insurance, but also the pension system in 
general. Pension funds – in private and social insurance – do not have many 
instruments to safeguard their business against the rising life expectancy. It is 
no coincidence that calls for securitization were also embedded in socio-
political conventions, for example in the case of the OECD, which called to 
improve the instruments to securitize against longevity, not least as a policy to 
act against the demographic pressure on public and private pension systems 
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(De Mey 2007, 38).3 Business economists too argued for a quick development 
of life insurance securitization, also for socio-political reasons (Lorson 2012, 2 
et seq.). The topic has recently attracted much scholarship. Most studies focus 
on how to define an appropriate price for securities based on longevity and 
mortality risks (Lorson and Wagner 2012; Lin and Cox 2005, 227-52). In all 
these debates, implicitly or explicitly, the responsibility of the state for provid-
ing social security for the elderly gradually shifted to the financial market and 
the community of profit-oriented investors. Here too, the conventions ad-
dressed by actors like the state, changed from a socio-political to a financial-
ized context.  
4.  The Mathematical Basis of Securitization and the 
Mathematicians’ Role in the 2007 Crisis 
As mentioned at the beginning, securitization was a crucial factor in the finan-
cial crisis of 2007/08, especially in the context of the subprime crisis of the 
U.S. mortgage market. Current assessments of the crisis argue that there is not 
one single factor, but a complex cluster of factors causing the breakdown. 
These include: the extremely low interest rates since 2001, lenient lending 
practices in the markets for subprime mortgages, a shadow banking system 
with high leverage investments, questionable accounting practices, and mis-
judgments of rating agencies. The collapse of parts of the U.S. mortgage mar-
ket triggered several other crises: the banking crisis in the U.S. and in European 
countries, and – indirectly – a budgetary and sovereign debt crisis of several 
European countries, followed by the currency crisis of the Euro (Lybeck 2011; 
Baig and Choudhry 2013, 26-9; Senate Subcommittee on Investigations 2011; 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Kobrak and Wilkins 2013).  
Securitization was involved because the subprime loan market and parts of 
the derivative market were backed to a large degree by complex and intrans-
parent securities. When the U.S. Federal Reserve started to raise interest rates 
in 2004/05 in order to act against the rising inflation, many lenders of subprime 
mortgages had to default. In 2007, the subprime market quickly collapsed, and 
several structured products, in particular mortgage-backed securities and credit 
default swaps, lost their previous value. Although the market for insurance-
linked securities suffered less than that for other securities, insurance and rein-
surance companies still took severe losses from their engagement in securitiza-
tion. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers – an investment bank intensely 
engaged in the securitization business – markets for mortgage- and asset-
                                                             
3  See also <http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2014/12/09/oecd-calls-for-capital-markets-to-embrace-
longevity-risk-hedging> (Accessed July 20, 2015). 
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backed securities also collapsed. AIG – one of the market leaders – had to be 
saved by a government bailout. Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac also only sur-
vived after massive government interventions. Other banking and insurance 
corporations also suffered; Swiss Re for example wrote down its portfolio by 
more than 1 billion dollars (Lybeck 2011, 112-8, 145-62; Kindleberger and 
Aliber 2011, 257-72; James et al. 2013, 349 et seq.; Cummins 2009, 485; Shelp 
and Ehrbar 2009; Lengwiler 2012, 164 et seq.). Some measures against the 
crisis proved counter-productive. At the beginning of the crisis in 2007 and 
2008, asset-backed securities were accepted by central banks as securities for 
the balance sheets of banking institutions – a decision that fueled the spread of 
securitization in the midst of the crisis (Baig and Choudhry 2013, 28).  
In relation to securitization, the crisis of 2007 raises two questions. First, it 
challenges the seemingly sound mathematical basis of the products of securiti-
zation, provoking a debate about the technical solidity of securitization. Sec-
ond, as securitization was deeply entangled with the escalation of the crisis, the 
economic downturn provoked fundamental criticisms against securitization 
itself (Orléan 2014, 259-71). Both criticisms will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs and illustrated with the exemplary case of insurance-related securit-
ization.  
First to the question to what extent the mathematical basis of securitization 
was to be blamed for its failure in the financial crisis since 2007. The question 
also points to the possible responsibility of mathematicians and actuaries in-
volved in the construction of securitized investment products for the aggrava-
tion of the crisis. It is undisputed that actuaries and mathematicians had a say in 
the design and the implementation of processes of securitization. The whole 
expansion of the market for derivatives was partly based on the possibility of 
mathematically calculating an adequate pricing of options based on the Black-
Scholes-Merton models mentioned above (MacKenzie 2006, 143-84). In this 
context, insurance and reinsurance actuaries often acted as experts on cata-
strophic and other risks, and provided the calculation of the necessary indices 
for the construction of securities. They did this not just for their own compa-
nies, but also as consultants for commercial banks and other bond issuers. In 
the insurance sector, the policy of securitization was promoted mainly by actu-
aries, which saw in the new market a potential for their companies’ business. In 
the banking sector, securitization was mainly promoted by managers and busi-
ness economists, while actuaries – at least at the beginning of the process – 
only played a marginal role (Bühlmann and Lengwiler 2015). 
It is also worth noting that the actuarial community, up to the outbreak of 
the crisis, remained split about securitization. The major part of the actuarial 
profession remained skeptical, whereas a small but influential minority em-
braced the new technique as a way of diversifying insured risks. At least the 
launch of Cat bonds in the 1990s apparently happened without much defining 
influence of the actuarial profession. Actuaries were mainly providers of data 
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(loss indices) for the construction of securities, whereas the construction and 
pricing of securities was executed by accountants and business economists 
(Bühlmann and Lengwiler 2015). Thus, some observers, as late as 2000, noted 
that, due to the marginal status of actuaries in securitization, the mathematiza-
tion of the process, at least in insurance-related securitization, was not very 
developed at all, and that a lot of theoretical work still had to be done, for ex-
ample on risk measurement and adequate pricing of securities (Cox, Fairchild 
and Pedersen 2000, 158). Despite these obstacles and reservations, the influ-
ence of mathematicians and actuaries had been gradually growing since the 
1990s, and some important figures of the actuarial community were involved in 
the design of insurance-related securities, for example James Tilley (*1950) 
who worked for Morgan Stanley (at that time one of the leading U.S. invest-
ment banks) on the construction of Cat bonds, or Prakash A. Shimpi, who until 
2004 worked for Swiss Re in senior management positions and lead a subsidi-
ary of Swiss Re dedicated to trading insurance risks (Cox, Fairchild and Peder-
sen 2000, 185). 
Against this background, there is no doubt about the active and decisive en-
gagement of at least part of the actuarial community in policies of securitiza-
tion. The more important issue is whether their work – the mathematical for-
mulae upon which securitization was based – can be blamed for the collapse of 
the market for asset-backed securities. There is no clear answer to this question. 
The literature takes two opposite positions.  
The more critical perspective insists that mathematicians and actuaries were 
responsible as one of several involved actors for the collapse of the market for 
securitization and for the respective parts of the crisis. Mathematicians and 
actuaries at least tolerated structured products being constructed in an intrans-
parent and far too complex way. These critical voices argue that mathematical 
finance might be good in the construction of theories while conceding that the 
reality of the financial markets had nothing in common with the theoretical 
assumptions. Markets cannot be modeled – according to this criticism – as a 
perfect and efficient entity. The related no-arbitrage theory is also criticized for 
lacking any empirical ground and helping to confuse theory and reality so that 
investors assumed that the models were built after objective statements, where-
as they merely reflected theoretical assumptions. Another problem is seen in 
the strong and effective alliance between mathematics and economics. Econo-
mists referred to mathematical expertise in order to provide an aura of objectiv-
ity and trustworthiness for their investment products, and mathematicians were 
eager to help economists because financial markets provided a promising and 
highly prestigious field of application for their theorizing (MacKenzie 2006, 
243-60; Bieta and Milde 2014a, 2014b). 
Authors who avoid blaming mathematicians for the crisis argue that the work 
of mathematicians and actuaries was mainly a theoretical endeavor and not meant 
to give a clear, objective assessment of the dynamics of financial markets. They 
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make a sharp differentiation between the model and the reality of financial mar-
kets. The models mathematicians built were meant as regulative ideas with 
heuristic value – in order to get a rough, approximate understanding of the real 
world –, but not as objective descriptions with a prognostic value. Models are 
seen as full of insecurities, not to be held for eternal truths. These authors deem 
it unfair to put the blame on the mathematicians when the fault actually lies 
with the public and its misunderstanding of the validity of mathematical mod-
els (Schweizer, Soner and Teichmann 2015; Bühlmann 1998). Some econo-
mists and actuaries even argue that it was unavoidable that securitization in-
cluded a certain lack of transparency. Relying on a perfect market model and 
on the principle of no-arbitrage, they argue that lack of transparency and 
asymmetries of information are inherent elements of financial markets, not least 
offering the necessary incentives for securitization. A complete market with full 
information transparency and no transaction costs – a situation of no-arbitrage – 
would not offer a price for the repackaging of risks in the form of securities, and 
therefore no profits for securitization. Only if markets became more efficient 
would the incentives for securitization decrease (Cummins 2004, 9-14; Cox, 
Fairchild and Pedersen 2000, 158; Hill 1996, 1101-5). 
This defending argument is not denying the involvement of mathematicians 
and actuaries in securitization. Rather, it asserts that their influence has not 
been strong enough to prevent false conclusions of their calculations and an 
exaggerated belief of the public in the solidity of their assessments. Actuarial 
figures retrospectively stress that the market was driven by management deci-
sions and by investors’ demand, whereas the warnings of actuaries and mathe-
maticians were mainly overheard. Actuarial scientists like Hans Föllmer, Cath-
erine Donelly, or Paul Embrechts argue that the collapse of the market for 
derivative products rather depended on the application of actuarial assessments 
– beyond the reasoning of the involved actuaries – and the questionable busi-
ness practices of securitization like the lack of corporate control, fraudulent 
management practices, and an exaggerated confidence in the accuracy of the 
mathematical models. They assert that some actuaries did point at the uncer-
tainties of their assessments, the lack of sufficient data and of modeling capaci-
ty, the problems of standardizing data in order to make comparisons and gen-
eral assessments, and the difficulties in calculating an appropriate price (for 
example: Wemmer 2008, 1 et seq.). If these self-critical voices would have 
been heard, some dimensions of the crisis might have been prevented (Föllmer 
2009; Donelly and Embrechts 2010; for an early cautious voice: Bühlmann 
1998, 174-6). Embrechts also concedes that the reliability of mathematical 
models has been overestimated and that the issue of “model uncertainty” is still 
not properly understood and needs to be dealt with more deeply in future actu-
arial research. Such calls for more detailed analyses of the mechanics of secu-
ritization have become a common theme in the post-crisis literature (Das, Em-
brechts and Fasen 2012; Cummins 2009, 477). However, most of these self-
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critical voices only emerged during or after the crisis. Clearly, the normative 
effects of mathematical and actuarial expertise in constructing and legitimating 
new forms of market transactions, and in transforming capitalism as a whole, 
have clearly been underestimated by the actors (Orléan 2014, 318-20). Howev-
er, that investors and the public put so much confidence into the accuracy of 
the mathematical models was not just the fault of the model constructors. The 
problem lies also with the rating agencies. Their negligent policies of warrant-
ing high credit ratings for asset-backed securities despite their lack of transpar-
ency was an important factor to foster the general belief in the mathematics 
underlying securitization (Orléan 2014, 264-71; Lybeck 2011, 141 et seq.; Hill 
1996, 1076). 
The answer to the other question of whether securitization in general is a 
tainted form of developing financial products can be derived from the devel-
opment of the markets. There is much evidence that securitization is here to 
stay and will also expand in the future, despite the setback and the dubious 
reputation it gained during the crisis. Most market observers agree on this 
positive assessment. Inspired by the rhetoric of the presidential election cam-
paign, Morton Lane, a prominent mentor of insurance-related securitization, 
argued that the new investment forms were “a change we believe in” (Lane and 
Beckwith 2009; see also: Albertazzi et al. 2011; Cummins 2009, 463 et seq.; 
Wemmer 2009).  
The development of the markets, at least in the U.S., endorses this view. 
Currently, in 2014/15, the markets are not far away from where they stood 
before the crisis. The issuance of asset-backed securities in the U.S. reached 
225 billion dollars (2014), close to the all-time high of 289 billion dollars in 
2007. And the U.S. market for mortgage-backed securities reached issuance of 
850 billion dollars for the first half of 2015, with a clear growth tendency 
against 2014 – compared to the all-time high of 2,692 billion dollars (for the 
whole of 2005). Only in Europe has securitization not recovered from the 
breakdown of the market in 2008. Issuances in the securitization market 
reached highs in 2007 and 2008 (819 and 1,210 billion dollars respectively), 
but are still clearly below 300 billion dollars in 2013 and 2014 (SIFMA 2015). 
In insurance, for example, the market for Cat bonds has recovered from the 
crisis, reaching a value of 23 billion dollars in 2014; that is about 10 per cent of 
the global market for non-life reinsurance. Even a mega catastrophe like the 
nuclear disaster of Fukushima in 2011 only produced a temporary decline of 
the Cat bonds market. Similarly, though on a much smaller level, markets in 
life insurance securitization are growing again (Swiss Re 2013; Philips 2014; 
Cummins 2009, 485 et seq.).  
The recovery of securitization counts even more as the regulatory policies 
after the 2007 crisis has identified securitization as an operational risk for fi-
nancial institutions and has strengthened the regulatory expectations against the 
process, especially in the context of Basel III, for which the first draft was 
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published in 2010 and which was introduced in the European Union in 2014, 
and the insurance related Solvency II, published in 2009 (Lybeck 2011, 274-9; 
Baig and Choudhry 2013, 33 et seq.).  
The growing confidence of the market is also reflected in recent discussions 
of new growth areas for securitization, for example in the insurance of nuclear 
risks. The Fukushima catastrophe put the question of how to insure the risks of 
nuclear catastrophes under the spotlight. The arguments are still cautions. But 
some observers, such as the French economist and insurance specialist Pierre 
Picard, argue that, despite technical difficulties, there was no fundamental 
obstacle to transferring large-scale nuclear risks to the financial markets. Ac-
cording to Picard, the main problem for securitizing nuclear risks lies with 
defining their price. Damages from nuclear accidents are extremely expensive, 
and their long-term consequences, often over decades, make it difficult to cal-
culate their exact costs. That is the reason why currently nuclear risks are only 
partially covered by the insurance industry, mostly up to a certain amount of 
damage. The state is covering the remaining risk as an insurer of last resort. But 
Picard and others argue that the instrument of securitization allows the tapping 
into the vast resources of financial markets and that this could shift significant-
ly the distribution of responsibility between the state and the private industry. 
They see nuclear risks as insurable and a market price even for large-scale 
nuclear risks as feasible (Picard 2011; Louaas and Picard 2015; more skeptical-
ly: Koletschka 2013, 138). Obviously, this would also change the logic of 
covering for the consequences of a nuclear disaster risk. At the moment, the 
responsibility for dealing with such disasters lies primarily with the state, the 
political authorities, and ultimately the citizens. In a world of securitization, 
dealing with nuclear disasters – at least paying for the damages – would be-
come a commercial issue, dealt with by investors under the logics of the finan-
cial markets.  
5.  Conclusion 
What conclusions can be drawn with respect to the larger social implications of 
the rise of securitization? What conventions were addressed in the context of 
securitization, and how has the setting of conventions changed since the 1970s? 
Three points should be highlighted. First, the history of securitization reveals 
important aspects of the emergence of financialized capitalism, notably a long-
term shift in the social responsibilities and policies towards risks. The examples 
of mortgage credits, catastrophe risks, nuclear risks, or longevity and mortality 
risks all show a similar pattern. These risks were originally addressed – at least 
partly – within the logics of political or socio-political conventions, often with 
the state as an insurer of last resort or in the context of the welfare state. The 
trend towards securitization usually meant that the socio-political conventions 
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were replaced by financialized, market-oriented conventions, in which inves-
tors would take responsibilities, bear the risks, and eventually cash in the prof-
its or pay the losses of the financial transactions. The settings of these two 
conventions are very different. The socio-political convention is part of the 
institutional logic of politics, ultimately of the community of citizens, whereas 
the financialized convention is based on an anonymous community of inves-
tors, driven by a bet on future profits.  
Secondly, some of the examples, notably in the area of longevity risks and 
nuclear risks, show that the transformation from socio-political to financialized 
conventions often comes along with a privatization of formerly public respon-
sibilities. In both cases, securitization is still at an early stage and it is not clear 
how transformative the future development will be. But the vision of advocates 
of securitization is clear: The state will lose some of its current responsibilities 
– in the pension system and the insurance of nuclear risks – and delegate them 
to the financial markets. A similar process takes place in the securitization of 
credit and insurance risks. Here, responsibilities are transferred between private 
actors. Private corporations like insurances and banks delegate their previous 
business to the actors of the financial markets.  
Thirdly, the history of securitization clearly shows that mathematical and ac-
tuarial forms of expertise were driving forces for this trend. They acted as 
conventions of equivalence, making different forms of risks comparable and 
marketable. And with their normative authority, they increased the legitimacy 
of such transactions.  
Finally, it is important to note that the spread of securitization is still an on-
going and dynamic process. It is too early to predict how far this process will 
actually go. Some questions will have to wait further for a final answer: Will 
Europe take the same path as the more securitization-friendly U.S.? And will 
mathematical calculus be ultimately an instrument to stabilize practices of 
securitization or will it continue provoking exaggerated confidence in a basical-
ly unstable technique? 
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